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A COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO NEW YORK'S TAX
DEDUCTION FOR INVESTMENT IN ITS OWN TUITION
SAVINGS PROGRAM
Amy Remus Scott*
The Internal Revenue Code provides guidelines for states to create and maintain
college tuition savings programs which offer federal tax benefits to investors. Sev-
eral states have enacted tuition savings plans in accordance with these
guidelines. In addition to the federal tax benefits allowed, New York offers a state
tax deduction to New York residents who invest in its plan, the New York College
Choice Tuition Savings Program. New York does not offer the deduction, how-
ever, to residents who invest in comparable programs offered by other states. The
tax deduction thus creates an incentive for residents to invest in the in-state pro-
gram and discriminates against interstate investment in the tuition programs
offered by other states. This Note argues that the incentive created by the New York
tax deduction violates the United States Constitution by discriminating against
interstate commerce.
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code allows states to create "qualified
State tuition programs"' which offer significant federal tax
benefits' to individuals who invest in the programs to save for
rising college tuition costs. Section 529(b) defines a "qualified
State tuition program" (section 529 Plan) as "a program... under
which a person... may make contributions to an account which is
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husband, Ryan-for their encouragement and support.
1. 26 U.S.C. § 529 (1996).
2. Section 529(c) (1) explains that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection,
no amount shall be includible in gross income of a designated beneficiary under a qualified
State tuition program, or a contributor to such program on behalf of a designated benefici-
ary with respect to any distribution or earnings under such program." Id. § 529(c)(1).
Section 529(c)(3) also states that "[any distribution under a qualified State tuition pro-
gram shall be includible in the gross income of the distributee." Id. § 529(c) (3). Thus,
taxation of earnings under the program is deferred until a distribution is made and is in-
cluded only in the gross income of the distributee (e.g., the child), who typically will be in a
lower tax bracket than the contributor (e.g., the parent).
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established for the purpose of meeting the qualified higher
education expenses of the designated beneficiary of the account."'
Account owners receive an exemption from federal income tax for
any undistributed earnings, and, upon a qualified withdrawal from
an account, the interest earned is included in the taxable income
4of the designated beneficiary, rather than the account owner.
Section 529 Plans allow distributions from program accounts to be
used at any approved college or trade school in the country.5
New York was one of the first states to enact a section 529 Plan
by passing the New York College Choice Tuition Savings Program
(New York Savings Program) in 1997.6 In addition to the federal
tax benefits outlined in section 529, 7 New York residents who in-
vest in the New York Savings Program also receive a state tax
deduction for at least part of their contribution. 8 Under New York
3. Id. § 529(b). A program must meet six other requirements in order to qualify as a
"qualified State tuition program": (1) contributions to the program must be made only in
cash; (2) the program must impose a "more than de minimis penalty" on any withdrawals
from the account not used for qualified higher education expenses; (3) the program must
maintain a separate accounting for each designated beneficiary; (4) neither account owners
nor designated beneficiaries may direct any investment made by the program; (5) the pro-
gram must prohibit the designation of any interest in the plan as security for a loan; and (6)
the program must provide safeguards to ensure that contributions on behalf of a designated
beneficiary do not exceed those necessary to provide for the qualified higher education
expenses of that beneficiary. See id. § 529(b) (2)-(7).
4. See id. § 529(c).
5. "Eligible Education Institution" is defined as "an institution which is described in
section 481 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. § 1088)." Id. § 529(e) (5) (A).
6. See N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 695 (McKinney 1997) ("There is hereby established the col-
lege choice tuition savings program and such program shall be known and may be cited as
the 'New York state college choice tuition savings program.' "). See the NEW YORK STATE
COLLEGE CHOICE TUITION SAVINGS PROGRAM, PROGRAM BROCHURE 1 (1998) [hereinafter
NEW YORK PROGRAM BROCHURE], which outlines the program. It states:
[I]ndividuals participating in the Program... establish accounts.., in a statutory
trust fund of which the Comptroller of the State of New York... is trustee .... The
Account Owner makes cash contributions to an Account... which are invested in a
blend of equity, debt and money market instruments. Each Account has a single
beneficiary .... All individuals, regardless of their income level, may contribute. The
purpose of the Accounts is to fund 'Qualified Higher Education Expenses' of the
Designated Beneficiary. These expenses consist of required tuition, fees, the costs of
books, supplies and certain equipment for students enrolled at 'Institutions of
Higher Education,' and include certain room and board costs for students attending
these institutions on at least a half-time basis.... Up to $100,000 may be contributed
under the Program by Account Owners to all Accounts with the same Designated
Beneficiary.
Id.
7. See supra note 2.
8. Deductions "shall not exceed five thousand dollars." 59 N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 612(c) (32) (McKinney 1998).
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tax law, the "New York adjusted gross income"9 of a resident is de-
fined as his federal adjusted gross income, subject to specified
modifications. ° One such modification allows a New York resident
to calculate his New York adjusted gross income for a given year by
deducting from his federal adjusted gross income any contribu-
tions, subject to an annual maximum, that he has made during
that taxable year as an account owner to an account established
under the New York Savings Program."
The New York Savings Program and several other states' section
529 Plans are open to residents of any state. 2 Thus, a New York
resident may participate in the New York Savings Program or in
the section 529 Plan of another state which permits nonresident
participation. New York offers a state tax deduction, however, only
to its residents who invest in the New York Savings Program. 3 If a
New York resident invests in the New Hampshire College Tuition
Savings Plan,'4 for example, New York does not offer her a deduc-
tion for her New York state taxes.
New York's state tax deduction creates an incentive for its resi-
dents to invest in the New York Savings Program rather than
another state's section 529 Plan. A New York resident might oth-
erwise prefer another state's plan if she believes that the other plan
is better maintained or has a higher rate of return. New York thus
creates a preference for its in-state section 529 Plan. This incentive
raises the concern that New York is discriminating against interstate
9. Id. § 612(a). The "New York adjusted gross income" is the tax base to which the
New York tax rates are applied.
10. See 59 N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(a) (McKinney 1998).
11. See id. § 612 (c) (32). The section states:
There shall be subtracted from federal adjusted gross income: ... Contributions
made during the taxable year by an account owner to one or more family tuition ac-
counts established under the New York state college choice tuition savings
program... provided, however, the contributions by the owner of an account or ac-
counts for the taxable year shall not exceed five thousand dollars.
Id.
12. See, e.g., NEW YORK PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that "[t]he
Program is not restricted to residents of New York"); Kristin Davis, How to Ace Saving for
College, KiPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., Feb. 1999, at 88, 90-92 (stating that the following state
plans accept investment from residents of any state: Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Utah; other states-including
Connecticut, NewJersey, Texas, and Vermont--offer Savings Plans only to state residents).
13. See 59 N.Y. TAx LAw § 612(c) (32) (McKinney 1998) (specifying a state tax deduc-
tion only for investment in the NewYork state college choice tuition savings program).
14. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195-H (1997).
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commerce in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion."
Courts have decided numerous Commerce Clause cases involv-
ing questions of state taxation. 6  These cases typically have
addressed state taxes favoring in-state, over out-of-state, private
businesses. 7 This Note addresses the proper application of the
Commerce Clause to a state tax deduction that discriminates in
favor of the state itself.8
This Note concludes that a state's grant of a tax deduction solely
for investment in its own section 529 Plan and not for investment
in out-of-state section 529 Plans is an unconstitutional restriction
of interstate commerce. Part I reviews the dormant Commerce
Clause generally and as applied to state tax plans and finds that the
state tax deduction for investment only in an in-state section 529
Plan would be unconstitutional if the section 529 Plans were pri-
vate enterprises. Part II argues that the New York tax deduction
favors the state, as opposed to private businesses within the state.
Part II also offers and then rejects the idea that the state is distrib-
uting state-created benefits which would exempt it from
Commerce Clause restraints. Part III describes the market partici-
pant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause and determines
that the exception does not apply to the New York deduction for
investment in section 529 Plans. In addition, Part III argues that, in
offering the New York Savings Program, the state is performing
"private-type" activity and that state regulation of this activity, like
state regulation favoring in-state private businesses, should be
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power... [t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States."); infra Part L.A (discussing the dormant Com-
merce Clause).
16. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S.
564, 593 (1997) (holding that an exemption statute which singled out charitable institutions
that served mostly state residents for beneficial tax treatment and penalized those institu-
tions that performed principally interstate business violated the dormant Commerce
Clause); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 327 (1996) (holding that North Carolina's
intangibles tax on the fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents,
charged at a rate inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income
tax, facially discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Com-
merce Clause); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977) (holding
that a tax which imposed greater liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause).
17. See supra note 16.
18. See Scott K. Attaway, The Case for Constitutional Discrimination in Taxation of Out-of-
State Municipal Bonds, 76 B.U. L. REv. 737, 756-68 (1996) (discussing this idea in the con-
text of state-issued municipal bonds); Maxwell A. Miller & Mark A. Glick, The Resurgence of
Federalism: The Case for Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 25 (1997); infra Parts IIA-B,
III.B (evaluating the municipal bond scenario as it relates to the question presented in this
Note).
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invalid under Commerce Clause restraints. This Note concludes
that the state tax deduction offered only for investment in an in-
state section 529 Plan violates the Commerce Clause.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE TAXATION
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that
"Congress shall have [plower ... [tio regulate Commerce ...
among the several States." 9 Although stated as an affirmative
power of Congress, the Clause places a "dormant" limit on the
power of the states.20 The Supreme Court has explained that,
"[t] hough phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, the
Clause has long been understood to have a 'negative' aspect that
denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or
burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.'M The negative
aspect derives from the clause's purpose, to protect the welfare of
the Nation as a unified whole by checking the states' ability to re-
treat into economic isolation. The dormant Commerce Clause
reflects the Constitutional framers' desire to avoid the economic
balkanization of the states that occurred under the Articles of Con-
federation.23 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "it]he very
purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free
trade among the several States '2' and that "this Nation is a com-
mon market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the
free flow of... goods in response to the economic laws of supply
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)
("Despite the express grant to Congress of the power to 'regulate Commerce ... among the
several States,' we have consistently held this language to contain a further, negative com-
mand, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even
when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject." (citation omitted)). But see Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 574 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause has no
basis in the Constitution).
21. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994)
(holding that Oregon's imposition of a greater per ton surcharge on in-state disposal of
solid waste generated in other states than on disposal of waste generated within Oregon was
facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause). For examples of when a state may
justfiably discriminate against interstate commerce, see infra notes 50-57 and accompany-
ing text.
22. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 514 U.S. at 179-80.
23. See id.
24. McLeod v.J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
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and demand. 2 5 The underlying principle of the dormant Com-
merce Clause is that states may not disfavor the flow of commerce
across state lines.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause as Applied to
State Taxation of Private Businesses
Courts consistently have held that states may not impose a tax
that restricts interstate commerce by providing a direct commer-
cial advantage to private, local businesses.26 The Supreme Court
has held that state laws which facially discriminate in favor of in-
state businesses and against interstate commerce are subject to a
"virtually per se rule of invalidity."2 7 The Court held in Bacchus Im-
ports, Ltd. v. Dias2 8 that the prohibition of any tax which
discriminates against interstate commerce by favoring local busi-
nesses is a "cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. , 29 In
30Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court established that a
valid state tax cannot "discriminate[] against interstate com-
merce."3' The Brady court emphasized the need to focus on the
practical effects of a tax and not just the language or technical
structure of the statute.2
A tax discriminates against interstate commerce, according to
the Supreme Court, if it involves "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."33 The Court has emphasized that a tax is dis-
criminatory if it forecloses a tax-neutral decision. 4 In other words,
25. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976).
26. See supra note 16.
27. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994).
28. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
29. Id. at 268.
30. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31. Id. at 287. The four-pronged test used by the Brady court to establish the validity of
a state tax requires that: (1) there is a substantial nexus between the activity taxed and the
taxing state; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned based on activity conducted in the taxing state;
(3) the tax is related to services provided by the state; and (4) the tax does not discriminate
against interstate commerce. See id.
32. See id. at 288-89.
33. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984) (stating that
whether a "tax diverts new business into the State or merely prevents current business from
being diverted elsewhere, it is still a discriminatory tax that 'forecloses tax-neutral deci-
sions[']"); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977) (stating that
a discriminatory New York transfer tax on securities regulations "forecloses tax-neutral deci-
sions and creates both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discriminatory
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a tax incentive which favors in-state activity is discriminatory if a
decision-maker cannot reasonably ignore it when choosing be-
tween in-state and out-of-state activities. In Smith v. New Hampshire
Department of Revenue Administration,'5 the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court struck down an interests and dividends tax that
provided tax benefits for investment at in-state banks but not for
investment at out-of-state banks.3 6 Relying on Supreme Court deci-
sions in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission 3 and Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,3 8 the court held that the "tax's
distinction between in-state and out-of-state banks is unconstitu-
tional because a New Hampshire depositor's decision about
whether to invest in a domestic or foreign bank is not governed by
tax-neutral criteria."3 9 The court concluded that the tax "violates
the principle that state statutes may not constitutionally encourage
the development of local industry by means of taxing measures
that impose greater burdens on economic activities taking place
outside the State than would be placed on similar activities within
the State."4° By offering the tax deduction only to certain resi-
dents-those who select New York's section 529 Plan-the state
has ensured that New York residents interested in investing in a
section 529 Plan will consider the tax deduction in trying to
achieve the highest post-tax return. By making the tax deduction a
significant factor in the selection of a tuition plan, New York has
foreclosed tax-neutral decisions by potential plan participants.
4 1
Even commentators who contend that the Court's tax-neutral
requirements "should be read less expansively than their literal
language permits" 42 offer an explanation that would invalidate the
New York tax deduction as applied to private businesses. They ar-
gue that two core principles underlie the Court's state tax
burden on commerce to its sister States"); Smith v. New Hampshire Dep't. of Revenue Ad-
min., 692 A.2d 486, 497 (N.H. 1997) (holding that a state interests and dividends tax was
unconstitutional because "New Hampshire residents have a strong economic incentive to
invest in banks located within the State").
35. 692 A.2d 486 (N.H. 1997).
36. See id. at 497.
37. 429 U.S. at 318, 329 (1977) ("No State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may
'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct
commercial advantage to local business.' ").
38. 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995) (stating that the dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause supports the goal of preventing states from retreating into economic isolation).
39. Smith, 692 A.2d at 497.
40. Id. at 497; see also Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 329.
41. For example, New York residents will not select a plan based solely on the highest
returns or the best investment record but will also take into account the New York state tax
benefit in calculating their final rate of return on the investment.
42. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 789, 805 (1996).
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incentive decisions: "[f]irst, the provision must favor in-state over
out-of-state activities; second, the provision must implicate the co-
ercive power of the state."43 Referring to the Supreme Court's
decision in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully," commentators ex-
plain that the "clear thrust of the opinion was that any provision
that reduces the taxpayer's 'effective [in-state] tax rate' as the tax-
payer engages in more in-state activity violates the Commerce
Clause." 5 Thus, state income tax deductions which favor in-state
activity "implicate the coercive power of the state, because the tax-
payer can reduce its state tax bill only by engaging in in-state
activity,, 46 and thus do not satisfy Commerce Clause review.
The Supreme Court's repeated prohibitions of state taxes dis-
criminating against interstate commerce have addressed taxes that
favor in-state private businesses. The Court has been emphatic
that a state may not impose a tax on interstate commerce that pro-
vides a direct commercial advantage to local businesses. Thus, if
the section 529 Plans discussed here were run as private businesses,
a tax discriminating against the out-of-state plans would be indis-
tinguishable from the many taxes the Court has previously
invalidated." A state tax favoring investment in a private in-state
tuition savings plan over investment in a private out-of-state tuition
savings plan would be invalid.
Even a facially discriminatory tax may survive, however, under
certain circumstances. If an otherwise discriminatory tax is com-
pensatory, such that it actually causes interstate commerce to bear
a burden already borne by intrastate commerce, courts will uphold
it.50 For example, if a state exacts an additional fee from out-of-state
waste producers who enter the state to dispose of their garbage,
the tax might be justified as a compensatory measure if in-state
waste producers contribute to the state's waste disposal facility
43. Id. at 806.
44. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
45. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 42, at 815.
46. Id. at 817.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
48. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272 (1984) (stating that while
"competition among the States for a share of interstate commerce is a central element of
our free-trade policy... a State may not tax interstate transactions in order to favor local
businesses over out-of-state businesses").
49. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
50. In Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996), the Court held that there are three
conditions necessary for a valid compensatory tax: first, a state must identify the intrastate
tax burden for which the state is trying to compensate; second, the tax on interstate com-
merce must be roughly equal to-and must not exceed-the tax on intrastate commerce;
and third, the events on which the intrastate and interstate taxes are imposed must be sub-
stantially equivalent. See id. at 332-33.
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costs through other state taxes.5' The rationale behind this doc-
trine is that "a facially discriminatory tax that imposes on interstate
commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and
,substantially similar' tax on intrastate commerce does not offend
the negative Commerce Clause."5 2 The New York tax deduction,
however, is not a compensatory measure. A measure is compensa-
tory when the state requires parties that cross state lines to bear a
burden that parties not crossing state lines already bear. A New
York resident investing in an out-of-state section 529 Plan does not
gain any benefit equivalent to the one that New York offers to resi-
dents investing in the New York Savings Program. The New York
tax deduction discriminates against interstate commerce with no
compensatory justification.
Another possible basis for upholding an otherwise discrimina-
tory tax is that the state is offering a subsidy to its residents that the
courts should protect.53 Although the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that direct subsidization is an acceptable means of
supporting intrastate commerce,54 courts and commentators have
distinguished tax benefits from protected subsidies.55 In New Energy
Co. v. Limbach,55 the Court stated:
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action de-
signed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace,
but only action of that description in connection with the State's
regulation of interstate commerce. Direct subsidization of domes-
tic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition;
discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.
57
51. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 346 n.9 (1992)
(discussing this possible defense, which the state did not present).
52. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 102-03
(1994).
53. While there is no crystal clear statement from the Court as to which subsidization
programs are acceptable, "[t]oday, every state provides tax and other economic incentives
as an inducement to local industrial location and expansion." Hellerstein & Coenen, supra
note 42, at 790.
54. See infra note 57 and accompanying text; see also West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (holding that, while the subsidy in question violated the Commerce
Clause, in general, "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no
burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local business").
55. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 42, at 868 ("[C]ourts applying the dormant
commerce clause should approach tax breaks and subsidies very differently."). But see
Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution and the Courts: The Use of Tax Ex-
penditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FoRlST L. REv. 855, 855 (1993)
(arguing that tax expenditures should be treated as subsidies).
56. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
57. Id. at 278.
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For example, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Har-
rison, Maine,5 8 the Supreme Court held that a property tax
exemption for charitable organizations within Maine violated the
Commerce Clause, because it excluded organizations that oper-
ated principally for the benefit of non-residents. 9 While the dissent
argued that this tax exemption should be viewed as a permissible
subsidy for charities focusing on in-state beneficiaries,' the major-
ity held that a tax exemption for one party is a discriminatory tax
on another party.6
Although the practical impact of a subsidy and a tax may be the
same, "[a] host of commentators have defended the distinction on
the basis of history and policy."6 2 The distinction between taxes and
subsidies "reflects the 'important economic reality' that subsidy
payments are inherently 'expensive' and signal a cost 'directly
borne internally' by the state.""
Subsidies do not distort local politics nearly as effectively as
do protectionist regulations and taxes or transportation regu-
lations .... While the general consumer interest is a weak
restraint on regulation that raises prices, the general taxpayer
interest is stronger .... This in turn disciplines legislatures to
be more cautious when they spend than when they regulate.6
In addition, "the distinction springs from the origins of the
Commerce Clause itself, for the Clause grew out of concerns about
abusive taxation. "65 Discriminatory state subsidy programs may be
permissible under the Commerce Clause, but courts will not treat
state tax deductions like state subsidies. Based on the distinction
58. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
59. See id. at 589.
60. See id. at 603-04 (Scalia, J, dissenting) ("Our cases have always recognized the le-
gitimacy of limiting state-provided welfare benefits to bona fide residents.").
61. See id. at 583 n.16, stating that:
Maine has ample alternatives.., to achieve its apparent goal of subsidizing the at-
tendance of the State's children at summer camp. Maine could, for example, achieve
this end by offering direct financial support to parents of resident children. Though
we have not had the occasion to address the issue, it might also be permissible for
the State to subsidize Maine camps directly to the extent that they serve Maine resi-
dents.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 42, at 846.
63. Id. at 846-47.
64. Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 43,
102-03 (1988) (footnote omitted).
65. Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 42, at 847.
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that courts and commentators have drawn between direct subsidi-
zation and taxation, the New York tax deduction does not qualify
as a subsidy and should be subject to Commerce Clause restraints.
The New York tax deduction for contributions to the New York
Savings Program is facially discriminatory. The deduction dis-
criminates in favor of the New York Savings Program and against
investment in another state's section 529 Plan.67 The New York tax
deduction also does not qualify as a compensatory measure or as a
state subsidy. Since it does not equalize burdens placed on intra-
state and interstate commerce it is not a permissible compensatory
measure. Similarly, under the distinction drawn by courts and
commentators between state subsidies and taxes, the New York de-
duction is not a permissible state subsidy.69
Thus, if the New York Savings Program were a privately-run
business, definitive authority would support the conclusion that
the state tax deduction favoring the New York Savings Program
would not survive Commerce Clause review. The remainder of this
Note addresses whether that result changes because the section
529 Plan is run by the state.
II. THE NEW YORK TAX DEDUCTION-A STATE'S
PREFERENCE FOR ITSELF
A. The State Favoring Itself Over Other States
The New York tax deduction for investment in the New York
Savings Program favors the state itself (by favoring the state-run
savings plan) and thus gives the state a competitive advantage over
other states. 70 As discussed in Part I.B of this Note, if a state's tax
66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
70. This direct state competition is unusual. One author comments that "states do not
ordinarily compete with each other for customers in the way Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola
compete." Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1113 (1986). The more typical scenario
involves a state tax favoring in-state citizens and their private businesses: for example, a
higher state tax imposed on products produced out-of-state and imported than on compet-
ing products produced in-state. See, e.g., Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (holding that Oregon's imposition of a greater per ton sur-
charge on in-state disposal of solid waste generated in other states than on disposal of waste
generated within Oregon was facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause); Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 (1977) (holding that a tax which im-
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policy were to favor in-state private businesses or citizens over out-
of-state private businesses or citizens, its action would be unconsti-• 71
tutional. The state's role in offering a section 529 Plan raises the
question whether a state's preference for itself, as opposed to pri-
vate in-state businesses, should lead to a different conclusion.
In Shaper v. Tracy,72 the Ohio Court of Appeals addressed a simi-
lar preference for a state itself. The court evaluated an Ohio
statute that defined state adjusted gross income as including the
interest and dividends on obligations or securities of any state or
political subdivision, but then exempted interest earned on bonds
issued by the state of Ohio and its political subdivisions. " The ef
fect of this statute was a preference for Ohio bonds over bonds
issued by other states. The court explained that "[t]he instant ac-
tion does not involve a taxation scheme whereby the citizenry of
Ohio are provided with a competitive advantage over the citizenry
of other states. Rather, the taxation scheme in the instant action
benefits the state of Ohio itself."
74
Similarly, the New York tax deduction for contributions made to
the New York Savings Program does not provide citizens of New
York with a competitive advantage over citizens of other states, but
instead creates a preference for the state of New York itself, as the
offeror of the New York Savings Program.7 s If the state were to pro-
vide tax benefits for investment in private investment plans within
the state, those benefits would provide an advantage to private
businesses offering in-state investment plans over private busi-
nesses offering out-of-state investment options. The New York tax
deduction similarly favors the party offering the New York Savings
Program. In this case, however, the favored party is not a private
citizen running a business, but instead is the state itself.
posed greater liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales discriminated against inter-
state commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause).
71. See supra Part I.B.
72. 647 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
73. See id. at 551 (evaluating OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5747.01(A)(1) (Anderson
1998)).
74. Id. at 553.
75. There are no private citizens running the savings plan who will benefit from their
"in-state" status. Only the state itself benefits, as the party offering the Plan, at the expense
of any other states which offer section 529 Plans. The state gains a competitive advantage
over out-of-state plans due to the favorable tax deduction. The New York Savings Program
may attract more investors, who might otherwise have invested in out-of-state plans, due to
the favorable tax treatment imposed by New York. The discrimination here is not between
in-state and out-of-state private individuals or businesses, but between in-state and out-of-
state state-sponsored Plans. The benefit of the New York tax deduction is conferred on the
state, not in its regulatory role, but in its role as the party offering the New York Savings
Program as an investment vehicle.
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The Shaper court held that the discriminatory tax preference was
constitutional. Without providing any significant analysis for its
conclusion," the court simply stated:
[W]e agree with the trial court's rationale that 'neither the
Supreme Court nor any case law examined has applied the
Commerce Clause to actions between governmental enti-
ties'. . . . Given the lack of any precedent to apply the
Commerce Clause to this type of taxation scheme, we are un-
able to find [the statute] unconstitutional as violative of the
Commerce Clause.78
Other Commerce Clause opinions suggest, however, that New
York's discrimination against out-of-state section 529 Plans in favor
of the New York Savings Program does violate the principles of the
dormant Commerce Clause and should be held unconstitutional.79
The dormant Commerce Clause represents a deeply entrenched
concern for maintaining free trade among the states and for pro-
tecting the welfare of the nation as a whole.80 Because the New
York tax deduction is offered solely for investment in the New York
Savings Program, it discriminates against out-of-state section 529
Plans and interferes with free trade across state lines."' The tax de-
duction provides a competitive advantage to the New York Savings
Program because citizens who want to maximize their overall re-
turn on college savings investment will rationally have to consider
any tax savings they may experience with the New York Savings
76. See Shaper, 647 N.E.2d at 553-54.
77. For a commentary on the puzzling nature of the court's "failure to tie its reasoning
to any constitutional doctrine," see Attaway, supra note 18, at 739 n.6. The author comments
that:
While articulating the legitimate state purpose of providing an incentive for residents
to invest in in-state bonds, the court made no attempt to explain why the means cho-
sen to achieve this purpose-a tax exemption that discriminates against income
earned from out-of-state bonds-is permissible under the Commerce Clause.
Id.
78. Shaper, 647 N.E.2d at 553-54.
79. See infra Parts II.B and III.
80. See supra Part I.A.
81. The tax deduction is discriminatory because it exempts investments made in the
New York plan but not in plans offered by other states. The deduction interferes with inter-
state trade by providing strong incentives for New York residents to invest in the in-state
plan and not cross state lines to invest in other plans. See supra Introduction (detailing the
New York tax deduction). New York may have a valid state interest in creating incentives for
state residents to invest and prepare for tuition expenses. That interest could be served in a
non-discriminatory manner, however, by offering the state tax deduction for investment in
section 529 Plans of every state.
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Program that they will not experience with any other Plan. That
tax savings will be a significant factor in their choice of a section
529 Plan and will deter investment in out-of-state section 529
Plans.s The question, then, is whether there are other compelling
reasons to place New York's discriminatory tax preference outside
83the confines of Commerce Clause review.
B. No Distribution of State-Created Benefits
States may act in protectionist ways when distributing state-
created benefits. 4 This principle typically applies when a state re-
stricts the benefits of state-run programs like schools, fire
protection, and energy to state residents.85 The underlying idea is
that the purpose of state government is to serve the people of the
state8 6 Although not articulated by the Ohio court, this may be a
rationale for the Shaper decision.87 In the context of state-issued
municipal bonds, residents of the state benefit in proportion to the
number of people who invest in the state's own municipal bonds.88
Residents across the state benefit from the programs that are
funded by the sale of the state's bonds.89 Contrary to the municipal
bond scenario raised in Shaper,90 however, the New York tax deduc-
tion does not affect the distribution of state-created benefits. The
money invested in the New York Savings Program is invested for
82. See supra Part I.B (discussing the illegitimacy of a tax that forecloses tax-neutral de-
cisions).
83. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 389
(1994) ("The real question is whether the [state action] is valid despite its undoubted effect
on interstate commerce."); Regan, supra note 70, at 1100 ("[T]here are other national in-
terests that may be involved in... taxation cases.").
84. See Attaway, supra note 18, at 756 ("The distribution of state created benefits is an-
other area where states may permissibly burden interstate commerce.").
85. Commenting on "rules restricting to state residents the enjoyment of state educa-
tional institutions, energy generated by a state-run plant, police and fire protection, and
agricultural improvement and business development programs," Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 442 (1980), the Court stated that "[s]uch policies, while perhaps 'protectionist' in
a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state govern-
ment-to serve the citizens of the State." Id.
86. See id.
87. See Shaper v. Tracy, 647 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
88. See Attaway, supra note 18, at 740-41 (commenting that states generally use mu-
nicipal bonds to fund desirable capital projects in order to spread the cost of the projects
across all those who will benefit from them over time).
89. For example, state residents may enjoy the benefits of a new school built with
money raised through state-issued municipal bonds.
90. See Shaper, 647 N.E.2d at 551.
WINTER 1999] A Commerce Clause Challenge to New York's Tax Deduction 393
the benefit of the investor and is not used by the state.9' In fact,
New York makes no profit on the New York Savings Program. 92
Residents of New York as a whole will not be differently affected if
a resident invests in an in-state or out-of-state section 529 Plan and
will not gain any benefit from increased investment in the New
York Savings Program.93 Although discrimination against interstate
commerce may be allowed "in a narrow class of cases in which the
[state or] municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny,
that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest,"
94
the relevant local interest here-to aid individuals in preparing for
the costs of higher education 95-- can be satisfied without any limita-
tions on the free flow of interstate commerce. Thus, the New York
tax deduction is not immune to the dormant Commerce Clause
limitations imposed on the states. Part III examines whether the
state's involvement in the private-type investment plan saves it
from a Commerce Clause violation.
91. The money is invested, depending on the number of years until the projected
withdrawal from the account, in a series of varying percentage combinations of three under-
lying portfolios: the College Savings Growth Fund, the College Savings Bond Fund, and the
College Savings Money Market Fund. See NEW YORK PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 6, at
14. Teachers Advisors, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association (TIAA), serves as the program manager. See id. at 2.
92. See id. at 29 (explaining that "[n]either the Comptroller nor HESC [N.Y. Higher
Education Services Corporation] is permitted to earn any profit at any time or in any man-
ner from or relating to the Program"). The Comptroller and the HESC are the state bodies
responsible for implementing the Program. See id. at 7. The only fee associated with the
current Program is a management fee equal to 0.65% of the average daily net assets of each
of the underlying portfolios, to be paid to TIAA for its services in connection with the Pro-
gram. See id. at 29.
93. Unlike municipal bonds which raise money for a state to fund services for all of its
residents, the New York Savings Program does not raise any money for the state and results
in no benefits to the taxpayers in general. There is no state revenue generated from the
New York Savings Program that might be used to fund state programs or social services. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text.
94. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994).
95. See NEW YORK STATE PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that the Pro-
gram has been "established to enable residents of New York and other states ... to fund
qualified higher education expenses").
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III. THE NEW YORK TAX DEDUCTION-A COMMERCE
CLAUSE VIOLATION
A. The Market Participant Exception
In an attempt to balance states' rights with the legitimate goal of
a free market across state lines,96 the Supreme Court has developed
an exception to dormant Commerce Clause restrictions when a
state itself participates in a particular market.97 State activity that
would otherwise fail Commerce Clause review will be upheld if it
falls within this exception. Part III demonstrates that the New York
tax deduction given only for investment in the in-state section 529
Plan does not fall within this exception and is not excused from
the dormant Commerce Clause restrictions explained in Part I.
The Supreme Court has held that states may discriminate explic-
itly in favor of local interests when the states act not as market
regulators, but as market participants.9" "The Court has reasoned
that when states expend their resources in conducting ordinary
business activities, they should be as free as private businesses to
decide with whom they wish to deal.""m In justifying this exception,
the Supreme Court stated that, "[n] othing in the purposes animat-
ing the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercis-
ing the right to favor its own citizens over others."100
The leading market participant case, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.,'" involved a Maryland program designed to encourage the
recycling of abandoned cars. ' Maryland offered a bounty on
abandoned cars, but the requirements for obtaining the bounty
were more burdensome for out-of-state processors than for in-state
96. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
97. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the Court noted that the market par-
ticipant rule was based on the role that each state must play "as guardian and trustee for its
people" as well as on the idea that private traders have a right to choose their trading part-
ners. See id. at 438-39.
98. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Dan T. Coenen,
Untangling the Market-Participant Doctrine, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 441 (1989) (explaining that
the market participant exception applies to the question whether dormant Commerce
Clause restraints apply when states prefer local interests in choosing their own trading part-
ners).
99. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives forBusiness, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 441 (1996).
100. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810.
101. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
102. See id. at 799-800.
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processors. 103 The Supreme Court found that Maryland entered "as
a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce
... [and restricted] its trade to its own citizens or businesses within
the State.', 0 4 The Court held that, although there had been a re-
sulting impact on the flow of interstate commerce, Maryland's
actions were acceptable because the state "ha[d] not sought to
prohibit the flow of hulks, . . . [but] [i]nstead, it ha[d] entered
into the market itself to bid up their price."'05 Accordingly, Mary-
land could favor local scrap producers over out-of-state producers,
because the state was competing in the market for scrap automo-
biles.'0 6
The Supreme Court similarly upheld discriminatory actions in
favor of states exercising a preference for hiring in-state workers'
0 7
and restricting the sale of cement to in-state residents.' 0 In White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,' °9 the Supreme
Court held that an executive order of the Mayor of Boston requir-
ing that all city-funded construction projects be performed by a
workforce at least half of whom were city residents did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause."0 The majority explained that a
hiring preference for local workers was acceptable, because the
city was acting as a participant in the construction market, and
"when a state or local government enters the market as a partici-
pant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause."
' Similarly, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,"2 the Court held that a South
Dakota policy confining the sale of cement produced at state-
owned plants to state residents did not violate the Commerce
Clause, because "South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unques-
tionably fits the 'market participant' label." 1 3 Thus, if a state acts
like any other private actor in the marketplace, the state is free
from Commerce Clause restrictions. As the Court explains,
103. Maryland offered the bounty on hulks in order to increase the value of the hulks
and the likelihood that they would be recycled. The state's requirements for establishing
title to the hulks in order to receive the bounty were less stringent for in-state than for out-
of-state processors. See id. at 800-01.
104. Id. at 808.
105. Id. at 806.
106. See id. at 809-10.
107. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 214
(1983); infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
108. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 (1980); infra text accompanying note
113.
109. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
110. See id. at 206.
111. Id. at 208.
112. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
113. Id. at 440.
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"when acting as proprietors, States should ... share existing free-
doms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the
Commerce Clause." 4
The underlying rationale for the market participant exception
supports characterization of the New York Savings Program as pri-
vate-type activity. The premise of the market participant exception
is that states can and do act as private market participants."' The
New York Savings Program is a clear example of such private-type
activity. The New York Savings Program takes the form of a stan-
dard mutual fund investment.1 16 Establishing and maintaining a
mutual fund is not an inherently sovereign activity but is, in its tra-
ditional form, a private business."' Like any private business, the
state is free from Commerce Clause restraint when it establishes
and maintains the New York Savings Program.' '1 For example, the
state is free to offer its plan only to state residents, even though it
would explicitly favor local interests to the exclusion of interstate
interests.1'9 Just as "South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unques-
tionably fit[] the 'market participant' label,"2 ° New York, as an
offeror of investment accounts, is unquestionably engaged in pri-
vate-type activity in the investment market. Complications arise,
however, when states act simultaneously as market participants and
as market regulators.1
2 '
114. Id. at 439.
115. See id. at 436-37 ("[T]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace.... There is
no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate
freely in the free market.").
116. Contributions made to the New York State College Choice Tuition Savings Pro-
gram are "invested... in special portfolios.... These portfolios use stocks, bonds and
money market instruments in an effort to achieve an appropriate mix of growth and
safety.... As with other equity and debt investments, the value of [the] Account is neither
insured nor guaranteed and will fluctuate in accordance with the returns of the underlying
securities." NEW YORK STATE COLLEGE CHOICE TUITION SAVINGS PROGRAM, ENROLLMENT
KIT 6 (1998).
117. For examples of the wide array of privately-run mutual funds, see Carla Fried et al.,
The Money 100 1998: The World's Best Mutual Funds, MONEY, June 1998, at 90-98.
118. It is only because the state subsequently exercises its coercive taxing power that it
is not protected under the market participant exception. See infra Part III.B.
119. Although New York has chosen to offer its Savings Program to citizens of all states,
some other states have elected to offer their plans only to state residents. For example,
Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, NewJersey, North Carolina, and Vermont are among the
states offering college savings programs only to in-state residents. See Davis, supra note 12, at
90-92.
120. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440.
121. See infra Part III.B.
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B. The Market Participant Exception and State Taxation
The Supreme Court will not apply the market participant excep-
tion automatically to every case in which a state acts as a market
participant. In New Energy Co. v. Limbach,12 the Supreme Court in-
validated an Ohio statute designed to provide certain tax credits
against a state-imposed fuel tax. Ohio offered the credit only to
ethanol producers in Ohio or to producers in states that afforded
similar tax credits to Ohio ethanol producers. 123 The Court re-
jected the market participant exception and held the Ohio statute
unconstitutional. 12 4 Again drawing the distinction between a sub-
sidy and a tax, the Court held that, although "the tax credit
scheme has the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular in-
dustry ... [t]hat does not transform it into a form of state
participation in the free market." 125 The Court distinguished other
cases, including Hughes,2 6 holding that taxation is "a primeval gov-
ernmental activity" 127 and that the Ohio tax credit "cannot plausibly
be analogized to the activity of a private purchaser." 28 Unlike a
bounty, which any private actor may offer, only the state, in its
governmental capacity, may offer tax benefits.
The simple fact that a challenged in-state preference is con-
nected with the state's purchase or sale of goods or services does
not alone determine that the preference will escape dormant
Commerce Clause review.'2 The market participant cases have es-
tablished:
a 'virtually per se rule' of validity for state discrimination in the
marketplace. A virtually per se rule, however, need not oper-
ate all of the time.... It follows that, even if a state looks
quite like a buyer or seller choosing trading partners, the
Court has left itself room not to treat the state as such.
30
122. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
123. See id. at 271.
124. See id. at 277-78.
125. Id. at 277.
126. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (upholding Maryland's
bounty on abandoned cars even though the requirements were more burdensome for out-
of-state processors).
127. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 277.
128. Id.
129. See Coenen, supra note 98, at 404.
130. Id. at 404-05.
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Thus, if a state exercises governmental powers that are not avail-
able to other private market participants (e.g., the taxing power),
it is not exempted from Commerce Clause restrictions."'
While New York acts as a participant in the investment market
by offering the New York Savings Program, it also exercises the
sovereign power of taxation. In Shaper v. Tracy,13 2 the Ohio Court of
Appeals addressed whether a state could offer a tax preference for
state-issued bonds without violating the dormant Commerce
Clause. 13  Ohio offered a state income tax exemption for interest
on Ohio-issued bonds but not on bonds issued by other states.
3 4
The Ohio court recognized the distinction between a state's par-
ticipation in a market and the use of its governmental power to
tax5 The court explained:
The Commerce Clause is directed at the state's actions as a
market regulator; therefore, actions as a market participant
are exempt from Commerce Clause analysis. Clearly, when a
state chooses to sell bonds and enter into the securities mar-
ket, it is acting as a market participant. However, when a state
chooses to tax its citizens, it is acting as a market regulator.
136
The Shaper court concluded that the market participant excep-
tion should not apply to the tax exemption exclusively available for
interest on Ohio-issued municipal bonds. 37 This same distinction
applies to the New York tax deduction. By offering a section 529
Plan, New York enters into the investment market and acts as a
market participant. Nonetheless, when the state separately applies
its taxing power to influence participation in the market, it acts as
a market regulator.
The market participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause is intended to allow a state to function like any other pri-
vate business when it chooses to conduct business in a particular
private market. 38 When a state then attempts to exercise its sover-
eign taxing power, however, it no longer acts like any other private
131. See supra Part II.B (discussing when a state might legitimately exercise its taxing
power in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce).
132. 647 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
133. See id. at 551.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 552.
136. Id.
137. See id. While the court rejected the market participant defense, it still upheld the
preference for Ohio-issued bonds on other grounds. See discussion supra Part II.A.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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business within that market.39 A tax will be held unconstitutional if
it "favor[s] in-state over out-of-state activities [and] ... implicate[s]
the coercive power of the state."1 40 Because New York exercises its
taxing power in relation to the New York Savings Program, it does
not act like a private market participant and does not fall within
the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause.
C. The New York Savings Program-A "Private-Type"Activity
Although the focus of the Commerce Clause historically has
141been on state preferences for private businesses, its application is
appropriate when the state uses its coercive taxing power to favor a
private-type activity that is only incidentally run by the state. The
factual distinction between New York's tax preference for the New
York Savings Program and the many cases in which state prefer-
ences have been invalidated1 42 is that the favoritism here is for a
state-run program. This factual distinction does not merit different
treatment under the dormant Commerce Clause. Even though the
New York Savings Program is run by the state, it is similar to hun-
dreds of other private investment plans.
The New York Savings Program is a private-type activity, despite
the fact that only a state has the authority to create and offer a sec-
tion 529 Plan.'4 3 Section 529 Plans function like and compete with
139. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 136.
140. Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives, 82 MINN. L.
REv. 413,424 (1997).
141. A typical formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause restriction on state activ-
ity emphasizes governmental regulation of private business such that "[sitates are barred
from discriminating against foreign enterprises competing with local businesses, and from
discriminating against commercial activity occurring outside the taxing State." Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 197 (1995) (citation omitted); see also
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) ("[T]he Commerce Clause responds
principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the na-
tional marketplace."); Attaway, supra note 18, at 761 ("Dormant Commerce Clause opinions
repeatedly have emphasized that the focus of the Clause is private or local trade."). The
Court applies these principles to nonprofit or charitable organizations as well. See Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (holding that
an exemption statute which singled out charitable institutions that served mostly state resi-
dents for beneficial tax treatment and penalized those institutions that performed
principally interstate business violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
142. See supra note 16.
143. See 26 U.S.C. § 529(b)(1) (1996) (stating that "[t]he term 'qualified State tuition
program' means a program established and maintained by a State or agency or instrumentality
thereof (emphasis added)).
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other private investment vehicles.'" Even state regulation of non-
profit or charitable organizations is subject to Commerce Clause
restrictions. 14 The Supreme Court invalidated discriminatory state
regulation of a nonprofit organization in Maine, stating that,
"[e]ven though [the organization] does not make a profit, it is un-
questionably engaged in commerce."'4 Similarly, the New York
Savings Program remains a private-type activity even though the
state does not profit from running the Plan.'
4 7
Allowing New York to favor its own section 529 Plan with tax
preferences leads to discrimination against out-of-state section 529
Plans and the economic isolation that the Commerce Clause was
intended to prevent.'" Creating a distinction based solely on the
state's involvement in the activity that it then regulates would ex-
pand a state's ability to shield any activity from constitutional
scrutiny. In order to protect the underlying goals of the Com-
merce Clause, a state cannot be free to exercise uniquely
governmental powers (e.g., the taxing power) to discriminate
against interstate commerce in relation to any activity in which it
first chooses to engage.
The underlying rationale of the market participant exception,
that states acting as participants in a private market should be
treated like other market participants,'" dictates that state regula-
tion of the New York Savings Program should be subject to the
same restraints as regulation imposed on private activity. If a state
engaging in private-type activity receives the benefits enjoyed by
other private actors, then regulation of that activity should be sub-
ject to the same limitations as regulation of those other private
144. Even in the absence of any state tax benefits, an investor is likely to prefer section
529 Plans to private investment plans because of their federal tax benefits but will compare
private plans with the section 529 Plans to determine which will result in the greatest return.
Section 529 and private plans will compete with each other. For example, if a section 529
Plan performs poorly enough, the tax benefits may not be adequate to make it more attrac-
tive than a successful private plan. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (explaining
section 529 Plans as a means to saving for educational expenses).
145. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564,
581-83, 595 (1997) (invalidating a Maine property tax exemption offered to charitable
organizations because the exemption applied only to charitable organizations which oper-
ated principally for the benefit of in-state residents).
146. Id. at 573.
147. See supra notes 92, 95 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
149. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) (stating that "[t]here is no indi-
cation of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely
in the free market").
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actors.15 ° Thus, just as the state is not free to establish discrimina-
tory tax incentives favoring in-state private businesses, the state is
not free to provide discriminatory tax incentives in favor of the
New York Savings Program. State discrimination in favor of that
private-type activity should be treated like state discrimination in
favor of any other private activity. Therefore, the state tax favoring
the in-state section 529 Plan over out-of-state section 529 Plans vio-
lates the Commerce Clause and should be held unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The New York tax deduction, which provides a state deduction
solely for investment in the New York Savings Program, facially
discriminates against out-of-state section 529 Plans. This state tax
deduction restricts the flow of interstate commerce by discourag-
ing out-of-state investment, contrary to the dormant Commerce
Clause's purpose of maintaining free trade among the states. New
York's two distinct roles must be recognized: first, it is participating
in the private-type activity of offering an investment plan; and sec-
ond, it is acting as a sovereign to create a tax preference for its in-
state private-type section 529 Plan over comparable out-of-state sec-
tion 529 Plans. Although in its first role New York participates in a
"private" investment market, its exercise of its sovereign taxing
power takes the state's actions outside of the market participant
exception. It is in this second role as a taxing sovereign that New
York violates the dormant Commerce Clause.15'
Policy arguments favor the maintenance of a competitive envi-
ronment in which section 529 Plans may operate. Section 529
Plans are not offered in order to raise money for the state spon-
sors152 but instead are specifically adopted for the purpose of
helping individuals "fund qualified higher education expenses.
"
,5
Providing investment incentives to help state residents prepare for
150. See id. at 439 (reasoning that state proprietary activity should share existing free-
doms from constraint enjoyed by private business because "state proprietary activities...
often are ... burdened with the same restrictions imposed on private market participants").
151. The first prong of activity alone is acceptable and, if challenged, would likely fall
within the market participant exception to dormant Commerce Clause review or within the
allowable distribution of state-created benefits. For example, the state could establish a
college savings plan and offer it only to state residents. The state's second, independent
activity, however, violates the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition against providing a
direct commercial advantage to local business.
152. New York is not permitted "to earn any profit at any time or in any manner from
or relating to the Program." NEw YORK PROGRAM BROCHURE, supra note 6, at 30.
153. Id. at 1.
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rising education costs is a legitimate and laudable state goal. States
could meet that goal, however, by offering a state tax deduction
for investment in any section 529 Plan, thus both encouraging in-
vestment and avoiding any discrimination against interstate
commerce. A competitive market among section 529 Plans, all of-
fering the same tax benefits, will result in more efficiently-run
Plans that produce higher returns on investment, thus best achiev-
ing the stated purpose of the section 529 Plans.
Although no federal appeals court has yet addressed this ques-
tion, the issue will inevitably arise as more states adopt section 529
Plans. The state's dual activities-on the one hand, maintaining a
private-type investment plan and, on the other hand, separately
exercising sovereign taxing powers to favor that in-state investment
plan-should not be confused. The first is permissible, but the
second is not. Courts should conclude that the state's role in run-
ning such a plan prohibits a discriminatory tax deduction favoring
its own plan over comparable plans offered by other states. There
is no valid interest served by allowing this infringement into a na-
tional area of free trade. Courts should uphold the principles of
the dormant Commerce Clause and declare the New York tax de-
duction unconstitutional.
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